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PUBLISH DISCRIMINATORY HOUSING
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Seventh Circuit in Craigslist Gave Websites a Free Pass to Publish Discriminatory
Housing Advertisements, 4 SEVENTH CIRCUIT REV. 152 (2008), at
http://www.kentlaw.edu/7cr/v4-1/opron.pdf.

INTRODUCTION
The Fair Housing Act provides that it is unlawful “[t]o make,
print, or publish, or cause to be made, printed, or published”
advertisements for sale or lease of real property that discriminate
against certain protected classes of persons. 1 Passed in 1968, in the
wake of a wave of urban riots caused, in no small part, because of
housing inequality, 2 the ban on discriminatory advertising has acted as
∗ J.D. candidate, May 2010, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology; B.A., Political Science, Oakland University. I would like to thank my
Mom, Dad, Gram, Popa, and the rest of my family and friends for all of their love
and support. Additionally, special thanks are owed to Dave, Kristopher, and Lori
Opron for their help with this Note.
1
Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (1968).
2
A survey taken of urban minorities in 1968 by the DETROIT FREE PRESS
revealed that the number two cause of the 12th Street Riots in Detroit, Michigan,
was “Poor Housing.” This factor was second only to police brutality and was more
important than poverty, lack of jobs, and six other enumerated factors. JUNE
MANNING THOMAS, REDEVELOPMENT AND RACE: PLANNING A FINER CITY IN
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a first line of defense against discrimination and a mitigator of the
devastating psychological effects of public displays of racism. 3
Unfortunately, the Fair Housing Act’s prohibition against
discriminatory advertisements has come under attack. In 1996,
Congress passed the Communications Decency Act to protect children
from websites that display inappropriate sexually oriented content. 4
This act aimed to limit the liability of interactive computer service
providers that attempt to screen inappropriate and illegal usergenerated content from their websites. 5 However, a misguided
interpretation of this act made interactive computer service providers
civilly immune as publishers and speakers of third party content,
unlike their print media counterparts. 6 Thus, a newspaper company
has to screen its print edition for classifieds that violate the Fair
Housing Act, but is free to post the discriminatory ads in their online
edition. In many jurisdictions, the ultimate result has been that those
wishing to find a place to discriminate based on race, color, religion,

POSTWAR DETROIT (CREATING THE NORTH AMERICAN LANDSCAPE) 130-131 (The
Johns Hopkins University Press 1997). Additionally, a major cause of the Watts
Riots of 1965 was the overturning of the Rumford Fair Housing Act of California,
which mandated equality of opportunity for black home buyers. Valerie Reitman &
Mitchell Landsberg, Watts Riots, 40 Years Later: Nine People who Were in the
Midst of the Turmoil Recall how Six Days of Violence Changed Lives—and L.A.
Itself, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2005, available at
http://www.latimes.com/news/local/la-me-watts11aug11,0,7619426.story. Inequality
of housing opportunity also played a pivotal role in the 1967 Newark Riots. Charisse
Jones, Years Later, Lessons from Newark Riots to Be Learned USA TODAY, Nov.
19, 2006, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2006-11-19riots_x.htm.
3
For information regarding the psychological and physiological effects of
racism see David R. Williams & Ruth Williams-Morris, Racism and Mental
Health:The African American Experience, 5 ETHNICITY AND HEALTH 243, 243-68
(2000); Rodney Clark, Racism as a Stressor for African Americans: A
Biopsychosocial Model, 54 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST. 805, 805-16 (1999).
4
Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2000).
5
141 CONG. REC. H8469-H8470 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (statement of Rep.
Cox).
6
Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997).
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sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin are now only a mouse
click away.
In Chicago Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc.
v. Craigslist, Inc., the Seventh Circuit held that an interactive
computer service provider is not liable for unscreened, user-generated
content displayed on its website. 7 The court held that the
Communications Decency Act mandates that an interactive computer
service provider may not be held civilly liable as the publisher or
speaker of user-generated content on its service. Thus, Craigslist could
not be held liable under the Fair Housing Act’s ban on making,
printing, or publishing discriminatory advertisements. Additionally,
the court held that Craigslist did not cause the discriminatory postings
to be “made, printed, or published.” Therefore, Craigslist was not
liable under the Fair Housing Act’s housing advertisement regulations.
Part I of this note will provide the historical and jurisprudential
background for the Craigslist decision. Part II will examine the
Seventh Circuit’s decision in Craigslist. Part III will argue that the
Seventh Circuit reached the incorrect result in Craigslist because the
court misinterpreted the Communications Decency Act and
overlooked that Craigslist should have been liable under the Fair
Housing Act for “making the discriminatory advertisements,
notwithstanding Communications Decency Act immunity. Finally, Part
IV argues that the court was incorrect to imply that public policy
dictates that interactive computer service provider should be treated
differently from other advertising mediums.

7

519 F.3d 666, 672 (7th Cir. 2008).
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I. BACKGROUND
A. The Fair Housing Act.
In June 1963, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. proclaimed, “[I]njustice
anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere.” 8 Dr. King explained that if
injustice was to be defeated, America must set out to eliminate not
only its overt manifestations but also its “subtle and hidden forms”
such as “housing discrimination.” 9
In reaction to the assassination of Dr. King 10 and the plight of
urban minorities, President Johnson signed into law the Civil Rights
Act of 1968. Title VII of that act, commonly known as the Fair
Housing Act, 11 sought “to provide, within constitutional limitations,
for fair housing throughout the United States.” 12 Congress intended
this act to “alter the whole character of the housing market.” 13
Section 3604(c) of the Fair Housing Act prohibits the use of
discriminatory housing advertisements. This ban is crucial to
Congress’ goal of eliminating housing discriminations because it
mitigates the harmful psychological effects of public displays of
racism 14 by making it illegal for sellers to announce their intent to
discriminate. The pertinent part of the Fair Housing Act states that it is
illegal:
To make, print, or publish . . . any notice, statement, or
advertisement, with respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling that
8

Dr. Martin Luther King, Speech at the Great March on Detroit (June 23,
1963) (transcript and audio recording available at
http://xroads.virginia.edu/%5C~PUBLIC/civilrights/a0121.html).
9
Id.
10
Jean Eberhart Dubofsky, Fair Housing: A Legislative History And
Perspective, 8 WASHBURN L.J. 149, 160 (1968-1969) (identifying that Dr. King’s
assassination encouraged the passage of the bill).
11
Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 note (2000).
12
42 U.S.C. § 3601.
13
Mayers v. Ridley, 465 F.2d 630, 652 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
14
See, Williams, supra note 3.
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indicates any preference, limitation, or discrimination based on
race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national
origin, or an intention to make any such preference, limitation, or
discrimination. 15
Additionally, reflecting Congress’ intent to create a broad prohibition,
the Fair Housing act provides that it is also illegal to cause
discriminatory advertisements to be made, printed, or published. 16
Courts have uniformly acknowledged that the test for determining
whether a notice, statement, or advertisement violates § 3604(c) of the
Fair Housing Act is whether it would indicate to an ordinary reader a
discriminatory preference or limitation prohibited by the statute. 17
Where this objective test is met, a plaintiff need not establish that the
advertisement was made with a discriminatory intent.18
Moreover, Congress designed § 3604(c) using broad, sweeping
language so it could be applied to “any publishing medium.” 19 Thus,
the ban on discriminatory advertising has been enforced in a wide
variety of circumstances, including: newspaper advertisements, 20 oral
statements, 21 signs, 22 telecommunication devices for the deaf, 23
15

42 U.S.C. § 3604(c).
42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (emphasis added).
17
Jancik v. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 44 F.3d 553, 556 (7th Cir. 1995)
(noting that it is uniformly accepted that because the Fair Housing Act prohibits
advertisements that indicate a discriminatory preference, courts should employ an
objective, ordinary reader standard, notwithstanding the subjective intent of the
author); Ragin v. New York Times Co., 923 F.2d 995, 999 (2d Dist. 1991) (citing
United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205, 215 (4th Cir. 1972)); see also Spann v.
Colonial Vill., Inc., 899 F.2d 24, 29 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (utilizing an analogous
reasonable reader standard).
18
Jancik, 44 F.3d at 556; Ragin, 923 F.2d at 999.
19
Hunter, 459 F.2d at 210-11.
20
Id. at 210.
21
Jancik, 44 F.3d at 556-557 (holding that oral statements can violate
§ 3604(c) of the Fair Housing Act).
22
Fair Hous. Cong. v. Weber, 993 F. Supp. 1286, 1291-92 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
23
United States v. Space Hunters, Inc., 429 F.3d 416, 419-421 (2d Cir. 2005).
16
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racially restrictive covenants recorded by a recorder of deeds, 24 and
even visual advertisements with racially suggestive themes. 25
However, the internet has become a devastating exception that
threatens to render the Fair Housing Act ineffective. The
Communications Decency Act has been inappropriately interpreted by
numerous courts as precluding an interactive computer service
provider from being considered a publisher or speaker of information
provided by a third party. Thus, interactive computer service providers
currently have no risk of liability under the Fair Housing Act’s ban on
the publishing of discriminatory advertisements. At a time when the
internet has emerged as a dominant and rapidly growing force in the
real estate industry, 26 this could prove to be a fatal blow to Congress’
goal of a discrimination free housing market.
B. The Communications Decency Act
In order to modernize an antiquated telecommunications
regulatory scheme, Congress passed the Telecommunications Act of
1996. Section 230 of Title V of the Communications Decency Act
aimed to protect interactive computer service providers “who take[]
steps to screen indecent[] and offensive material for their customers.”
27
This section states in pertinent part:
SEC. 230. PROTECTION FOR PRIVATE BLOCKING
AND SCREENING OF OFFENSIVE MATERIAL

24

Mayers v. Ridley, 465 F.2d 630, 633 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
Tyus v. Robin Constr. Corp., 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2791, 9-10 (N.D. Ill.
Mar. 4, 1993).
26
Sam Diaz, On the Internet, A Tangled Web Of Classified Ads With So Many
Sites, Sifting Is Difficult, WASHINGTON POST, Aug. 31, 2007, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/08/30/AR2007083002046.html?hpid=sec-tech.
27
141 CONG. REC. H8469-H8470 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (statement of Rep.
Cox).
25
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c. Protection for "Good Samaritan" blocking and screening
of offensive material.
(1) Treatment of publisher or speaker. No provider or user
of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the
publisher or speaker of any information provided by
another information content provider.
(2) Civil liability. No provider or user of an interactive
computer service shall be held liable on account of (A) any
action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or
availability of material that the provider or user considers
to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent,
harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such
material is constitutionally protected; or (B) any action
taken to enable or make available to information content
providers or others the technical means to restrict access to
material described in paragraph (1). 28
For the purposes of this act, the term interactive computer
service means:
any information service, system, or access software
provider that provides or enables computer access by
multiple users to a computer server, including specifically a
service or system that provides access to the Internet and
such systems operated or services offered by libraries or
educational institutions. 29
Furthermore, an information content provider is defined as “any
person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation

28
29

Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2000)
47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2).
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or development of information provided through the Internet or any
other interactive computer service.” 30
There is no dispute that Craigslist, as a website operator, falls
under the statutory definition of an interactive computer service.
Furthermore, there is no dispute that the third party visitors to
Craigslist’s fall under the statutory definition of information content
provider. Thus, the issue lies in the effects of the statute’s provisions,
not the applicability of the parties to its effects.
Section 230(c)(1) immunity began to take shape in Zeran v.
America Online. 31 In Zeran, the Fourth Circuit considered the appeal
of a customer of America Online who alleged that America Online: (1)
unreasonably delayed in removing defamatory messages posted by
third parties about him on America Online’s website, (2) wrongfully
refused to post a retraction of those messages, and (3) failed to screen
for future third-party-created defamatory messages. 32 The Fourth
Circuit held that “[b]y its plain language, § 230 creates a federal
immunity to any cause of action that would make service providers
liable for information originating with a third-party user of the
service. . .and precludes courts from entertaining claims that would
place a computer service provider in a publisher's role.” 33
Furthermore, the Zeran court stated that the purpose of the
Communications Decency Act was to minimize the threat that tortbased lawsuits pose to freedom of speech on the internet. 34 Thus, the

30

47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3).
Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997).
32
Id. at 328.
33
Id. at 330.
34
Id. The court assembled sparse comments made by Congresspersons about
reducing government involvement in the regulation of inappropriate content on the
internet. Id. However, the court failed to identify that this was not a call for free
speech on the internet, but rather an attack on the Exon Amendment to the same bill
that planned to use public rather than private forms of enforcement. For an overview
of the Exon Amendment, see Robert Cannon, The Legislative History of Senator
Exon’s Communications Decency Act: Regulating Barbarians on the Information
Superhighway, 49 FED. COMM. L.J. 51, 57-64 (1996).
31
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court held that the customer could not successfully maintain a
negligence suit against America Online. 35
The Zeran interpretation of § 230(c)(1) was largely accepted by
the other federal circuit courts of appeals 36 until the Seventh Circuit
challenged the interpretation in Doe v. GTE Corp. 37 In Doe, a group of
varsity athletes alleged that hidden cameras were placed in their locker
rooms, and videos of them were sold online.38 One of the parties
named in the suit was the webhost, GTE Corporation (“GTE”). 39 In
considering potential liability for GTE’s role in the case, Judge
Easterbrook provided, in dicta, two possible interpretations of the
Communications Decency Act. 40 First, he suggested that § 230(c)(1)
could be read as a “definitional clause.” 41 Thus, “an entity would
remain a ‘provider or user’—and thus be eligible for the immunity
under § 230(c)(2)—as long as the information came from somewhere
else; but it would become a ‘publisher or speaker’ and lose the benefit
of § 230(c)(2) if it created the objectionable information.” 42 Second,
Judge Easterbrook stated that “perhaps § 230(c)(1) forecloses any
liability that depends on deeming the ISP a ‘publisher.’” 43 However,
the court ultimately decided that § 230(c) liability was not implicated
in Doe and left the decision for another day. 44 That day finally came in
2008 when Craigslist came before the Seventh Circuit.

35

Zeran, 129 F.3d at 332.
See Ben Ezra, Weinstein & Co., Inc. v. Am. Online, Inc., 206 F.3d 980, 986
(10th Cir. 2000); Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F.Supp. 44, 52 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Batzel
v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1031 (9th Cir. 2003).
37
347 F.3d 655, 659-60 (7th Cir. 2003).
38
Id. at 656.
39
Id.
40
Id. at 659-60.
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
Id. at 660.
36
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II. CHICAGO LAWYERS’ COMMITTEE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER LAW,
INC. V. CRAIGSLIST, INC.
A. District Court
“NO MINORITIES,” “only Muslims,” and “no children” are
among the discriminatory messages contained in over 120 housing
advertisements posted on Craigslist, Inc.’s website from July, 2005 to
January 2006. 45 These discriminatory advertisements formed the
inspiration for the complaint filed by Chicago Lawyers’ Committee for
Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. (“CLCCRUL”). CLCCRUL is a nonprofit consortium of Chicago law firms that provides free legal
services in civil rights cases, including those involving the Fair
Housing Act. 46 The defendant, Craigslist, Inc. (“Craigslist”), is a
Delaware Corporation, whose business is founded upon its operation
of a network of websites that facilitate advertising for a wide array of
goods and services, including the sale and rent of housing. 47
The CLCCRUL’s primary motivation for bringing suit was to seek
a declaratory judgment that Craigslist, Inc.’s violated § 3601 of the
Fair Housing Act. 48 Additionally, the CLCCRUL asked the court to
enjoin Craigslist from continuing to publish discriminatory
advertisement and require that Craigslist take necessary precautions to
screen for discriminatory advertisements. 49 The CLCCRUL suggested
that the court require Craigslist to adopt a publicly displayed anti-

45

Complaint, Chicago Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc., v.
Craigslist, Inc., 461 F.Supp2d 681, 698-99 (N.D. ILL. 2006) (No. 06 C 0657).
46
Id.
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
Id.
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discrimination policy 50 and employ computerized screening
software. 51
Craigslist argued that CLCCRUL’s complaint failed on the
pleadings because Craigslist had immunity under §230(c)(1) of the
Communications Decency Act. 52 The District Court granted
Craigslist’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. 53 The court agreed
with the defendant that the Communications Decency Act barred the
defendants from being found liable for posting discriminatory usergenerated content. 54 The court reached this conclusion by utilizing its
interpretation of the plain language of § 230(c)(1). 55 The court rejected
the holding of Zeran because it “overstates the ‘plain language’ of
§ 230(c)(1)” by announcing a broad immunity for claims against
information content providers based on third-party content,
irrespective of whether the claims involve liability as a publisher or
speaker. 56 Instead, the court found that the plain language of the bill
only prohibits an interactive computer service provider from being
held civilly liable as a publisher of third party content. 57 The court
stated that it was not important to determine if Congress intended the
Communications Decency Act to apply outside the context of
defamation suits. 58 Instead, it was sufficient that the the plain language

50

To its credit, Craigslist now has an anti-discrimination policy that is
displayed on its website, available at http://www.craigslist.org/about/FHA.
51
Complaint, Chicago Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc., v.
Craigslist, Inc., 461 F.Supp2d 681, 698-99 (N.D. ILL. 2006) (No. 06 C 0657).
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
Id. at 698.
56
Id. at 693-94.
57
Id. at 696.
58
As discussed below in Part III(A)(2), Congress expressly intended to
legislatively overturn a line of defamation cases including Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v.
Prodigy Services Co., 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y.Sup.), wherein courts held that treated
interactive computer service providers as publishers because they tried to screen and
restrict access to objectionable material on their sites.
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was not at odds with Congress’ intent. 59 The court stated that its plain
language reading was “at least as harmonious with congressional
intent” as the readings proffered by Craigslist and the CLCCRUL. 60
Thus, the court found that its interpretation was proper and the
CLCCRUL was thus precluded from bringing its claim against
Craigslist as a publisher of the allegedly discriminatory
advertisements. 61
The District Court also briefly considered whether Craigslist
could be found liable under one of the Fair Housing Act’s other
prohibitions involving discriminatory housing advertisements. 62 The
court found that Craigslist did not make the discriminatory
advertisements because they originated from users of Craigslist’s
website. 63 Furthermore, the court found that Craigslist did not print
the discriminatory advertisements because when the statute was
drafted, the plain meaning of the term print did not encompass
computer based reproduction. 64 Thus, the court held that Craigslist
could not be found liable under any of the Fair Housing Act’s
prohibitions against discriminatory advertisements. 65
B. The Seventh Circuit’s Opinion
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the District Court’s grant
of judgment on the pleadings. 66 First, the court found that the
Communications Decency Act barred the defendants from being found
liable as the “publisher or speaker” of the user-provided content posted
59

Chicago Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc., v. Craigslist,
Inc., 461 F.Supp2d 681, 696-97 (N.D. ILL. 2006) (N.D. ILL. 2006).
60
Id.
61
Id. at 698-99.
62
Id. at 698 n. 18.
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
Chicago Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc., v. Craigslist,
Inc., 519 F.3d 666, 672 (7th Cir. 2008).
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on its website. 67 Second, the court held that Craigslist was not liable
under the Fair Housing Act for causing the advertisement to be made,
printed, or published. 68 Finally, albeit in dictum, the court posited that
several public policy considerations called for granting interactive
computer service providers immunity for civil claims involving userprovided content. 69
Although § 3604(c) of the Fair Housing Act is regularly enforced
against newspapers and other publishers, 70 the Seventh Circuit held
that § 230(c)(1) of the Communications Decency Act precludes
aggrieved parties’ ability to “sue the messenger” when the messenger
is an interactive computer service provider.71 In reaching this
conclusion, the court rejected both the CLCCRUL’s and Craigslist’s
proposed interpretations of § 230(c)(1). 72
The CLCCRUL advanced the position that § 230(c)(1) is
applicable only to interactive computer service providers that engage
in some sort of filtering, blocking, or screening of published
information. 73 It posited that § 230(c)(1) should be interpreted in light
of the section’s title: “Protection for ‘Good Samaritan’ blocking and
screening of offensive material.” 74 The CLCCRUL stated that this
narrower interpretation was necessitated by § 230(c)(2)’s focus on
limiting civil liability for those who filter or screen objectionable
material. 75 It argued that nothing in § 230’s text or history suggested
that Congress meant to immunize an information service provider
from liability under the Fair Housing Act. 76 Furthermore, there was no
evidence that Congress even remotely contemplated discriminatory
67

Id. at 671.
Id. at 671-72.
69
Id. at 668-69.
70
Id. at 668.
71
Id. at 672.
72
Id. at 669-70.
73
Id. at 669.
74
Id.
75
Id. at 672.
76
Id. at 671.
68
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housing advertisements when it passed §230. 77 Conversely, Craigslist
interpreted §230(c)(1) to provide interactive computer service
providers with comprehensive civil liability from information posted
on their services, notwithstanding any efforts to screen or block
objectionable or illegal information. 78
However, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the District Court’s
opinion that §230(c)(1) neither grants broad based immunity nor limits
immunity to interactive computer service providers that screen
objectionable and illegal information. 79 By engaging in what the court
called a natural reading of § 230(c)(1), it held that “an online
information system must not ‘be treated as the publisher or speaker of
any information provided by’ someone else.” 80 The court held that this
precluded Craigslist from being held liable as a publisher or speaker of
the allegedly discriminatory advertisements under the Fair Housing
Act’s ban on “publishing” discriminatory housing advertisements. 81
The court also considered the CLCCRUL’s alternative contention
that Craigslist could also be found in violation of §3604(c) of the Fair
Housing Act because it caused discriminatory advertisements “to be
made, printed, or published.” 82 The court admitted that Craigslist
played a causal role in the publishing of the discriminatory
advertisement. 83 It explained that “no one could post a discriminatory
ad if craigslist did not offer a forum.” 84 However, the court held that
this causal link was insufficiently proximate. 85 It insisted that
“[c]ausation in a statute such as §3604(c) must refer to causing a
particular statement to be made, or perhaps the discriminatory content

77

Id.
Id. at 672.
79
Id. at 669.
80
Id. at 671.
81
Id. at 672.
82
Id. at 671.
83
Id.
84
Id.
85
Id.
78
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of a statement.” 86 The court held that an idle publisher cannot be one
who causes a statement to be made. 87 Therefore, the court held that
Craigslist could not be found to have the requisite causal relationship
under §3604(c) because the record did not show that it offered any
inducement for anyone to post discriminatory advertisements. 88
Finally, Chief Judge Easterbrook spent a substantial portion of the
opinion providing dictum on the public policy reasons for absolving
Craigslist of liability as a publisher or speaker. 89 First, Chief Judge
Easterbrook argued that online services are not analogous to
newspaper classifieds, against which courts regularly enforce §3604(c)
of the Fair Housing Act. 90 Without elaboration, the court admitted that
online services share some common characteristics as a classified
section of a newspaper. 91 The court then compared online service
providers to both telephone services and courier services such as
FedEx and UPS. 92 Without further explanation, the court proclaimed
that craigslist neither made nor published any information transmitted
through its service. 93 Thus, the court implied that interactive computer
service providers should not be held to the same standard as
newspapers. 94
Second, the court suggested that the screening of user-generatedcontent may raise first amendment issues. 95 The court noted that
§ 3603(b)(1) of the Fair Housing Act allows owners of single-family
homes who do not own more than three single-family homes to
discriminate against the otherwise protected classes of people for

86

Id.
Id.
88
Id. at 671-72.
89
Id. at 668-69.
90
Id. at 668.
91
Id.
92
Id.
93
Id.
94
Id.
95
Id.
87
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whatever reason during the sale of their property. 96 However, the court
recognized that this exemption does not apply to discriminatory
advertisements under § 3604(c) of the Fair Housing Act. 97 Despite its
recognition, the court argued that “any rule that forbids truthful
advertising of a transaction that would be substantively lawful
encounters serious problems under the first amendment.” 98
Third, the court argued that the screening of user-generated
content may not be effective. 99 First, the court stated that simple word
filters would not work. 100 For example, a simple filter would block
color words such as white or black that may or may not be racially
descriptive. 101 Second, the court argued that human reviewers may be
equally poor at filtering out violative advertisements from legally
permissible posts. 102
Finally, the court stated that screening postings would be
economically inefficient for craigslist. 103 The court argued that
requiring Craigslist to screen its nearly 30 million posts per month
would be prohibitively expensive because the posts would have to be
reviewed by Craigslist’s staff of fewer than 30 employees. 104 Thus,
either Craigslist would have to increase its staff, and therefore, its
operating costs, or accept a long delay in posting time which would
make the service much less useful. 105

96

Id.
Id.
98
Id.
99
Id. at 668-69.
100
Id. at 669.
101
Id. at 668-69.
102
Id. at 669.
103
Id. at 668-69.
104
Id.
105
Id. at 669.
97
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III. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT ERRED IN CRAIGSLIST BY MISINTERPRETING
THE COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT AND INCORRECTLY HOLDING
THAT CRAIGSLIST DID NOT FALL UNDER THE COVERAGE OF THE FAIR
HOUSING ACT.
This section argues that Craigslist should have been held liable
under the Fair Housing Act for its role in the discriminatory housing
advertisements at issue. First, the Seventh Circuit incorrectly declared
blanket immunity for interactive computer service providers posting
user generated content. Second, the court could have alternatively
found Craigslist liable under the Fair Housing Act as one who made
the discriminatory advertisements.
A. The Seventh Circuit erred by basing its holding on a
misinterpretation of the Communications Decency Act
In Craigslist, the Seventh Circuit killed the dream of a
discrimination-free housing market. And worse, it did so by utilizing
an anachronistic textualist method of statutory interpretation. The
court viewed the Communications Decency Act as if it were drafted in
a vacuum, devoid of historical and jurisprudential context and
legislative history. The following sections seek to illuminate the errors
of the court’s use of this short-sighted mode of statutory interpretation.
Part 1 of this section begins, as all proper statutory interpretation
should, by analyzing the text of the Communications Decency Act.
Next, Part 2 puts the text of the statute in its proper context by
identifying the legislative history of the Act. Finally, Part 3 applies this
foundational material to prevailing canons of statutory interpretation to
reveal that the Communications Decency Act precludes civil liability
only where an interactive computer service provider screens its site for
inappropriate and illegal material.
1. Textual Analysis of the Communications Decency Act
Although an examination of a statute’s text is not an end in and of
itself, it is the proper starting point for statutory interpretation. This
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section argues that under a thorough textual analysis of the
Communications Decency Act, an interactive computer service
provider would be precluded from being treated as the publisher
and/or speaker of user-generated content for the purposes of civil
liability only where: (1) the information being presented was
generated by a third party, and (2) the provider makes efforts to screen
objectionable and illegal material.
For a case of such magnitude, that put the civil rights of so many
in the balance, Craigslist’s textual analysis is contemptuously short.
Section 230(c)(1) states that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive
computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any
information provided by another information content provider.” The
court held that because “[S]ubsection (c)(2) does not deal with the
liability of speakers and publishers” it read § 230(c)(1) as an
autonomous provision. Craigslist held that “[a] natural reading of
§ 230(c)(1)” precluded an interactive computer service provider from
being held liable as a publisher or speaker of third party content,
notwithstanding any attempts to filter inappropriate or illegal
material. 106 However, nowhere in the opinion does the court explain
why its reading is a natural reading, nor does it affirmatively refute
why other possible readings are inferior.
Despite the court’s silence, there is another plausible and more
logical interpretation of § 230. The whole act rule is a common rule of
statutory interpretation utilized by proponents of virtually every
doctrine of statutory interpretation. It provides that “Statutory
construction. . .is a holistic endeavor. A provision that may seem
ambiguous in isolation is often clarified by the remainder of the
statutory scheme. . .because only one of the permissible meanings
produces a substantive effect that is compatible with the rest of the
law.” 107
To apply the whole act rule, it is pertinent to identify each of the
Communications Decency Act’s components. The title of the
106

Id. at 670-671.
United Sav. Ass’n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates, Ltd., 484 U.S.
365, 371 (1988).
107
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Communications Decency Act reads, “PROTECTION FOR PRIVATE
BLOCKING AND SCREENING OF OFFENSIVE MATERIAL.” 108
An ordinary reader would expect that the material under such a
heading would be qualified by or directly related to the protection for
private blocking and screening of offensive material. Moreover, this
assumption is strengthened by the title of § 230(c) that reads,
“Protection for ‘Good Samaritan’ blocking and screening of offensive
material.” 109 Next, § 230(c)(1), the portion of the statute at issue in
Craigslist, states that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer
service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information
provided by another information content provider.”
Finally, § 230(c)(2) outlines the civil liability for providers of an
interactive computer service that “restrict access to … obscene, lewd,
lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise
objectionable” material. 110
When the whole act rule is applied to the Communications
Decency Act, it is apparent that the court should have accepted the
CLCCRUL’s interpretation of the text of the Act. First, it would be
illogical to assume that Congress intended to place a wholly
independent clause in the middle of an act whose title, subsection title
and other provision all share the common theme of screening of
offensive material. Second, the effect of such a reading is inconsistent
with the text of the other sections. The other sections of the
Communications Decency Act make a quid-pro-quo offer of legal
protection in return for interactive computer service provider’s
screening of certain material. 111 The government’s consideration in
this bargain is forfeited if § 230(c)(1) is interpreted, as it was by
Craigslist, as offering this protection up for free. Although it is
possible that this was the Congress’s intent, it is certainly more logical
to assume that, given the text surrounding § 230(c)(1) the government
108

Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2000).
47 U.S.C. § 230(c).
110
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2).
111
This is evidenced by the operative word for, which appears in both the title
of § 230 and § 230 (c).
109
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intended to get its part of the legislative bargain. Thus, taken together,
§ 230(c)(1) should be read to apply to interactive computer service
providers only when they engage in screening of offensive material.
As illustrated in the background section of this Note, the
CLCCRUL’s principal complaint with Craigslist’s behavior was that
Craigslist did not engage in any type of screening for the
discriminatory housing classifieds that were being posted on its site.
Because a proper textual analysis would hold that Craigslist would
only be precluded from civil liability as a publisher or speaker when it
screens offensive and illegal material, the court should have held that
Craigslist was in violation of the Fair Housing Act. However, a
statutory interpretation that considers only the text of a statute is shortsighted because it presumes that a legislature was perfect in
articulating its desires through the language it used. Because this is an
unrealistic presumption, it is pertinent that a statutory analysis
consider contextual evidence such as legislative history.
Moreover, even unapologetic proponents of textualism, who
adamantly devalue the weight of legislative history, recognize that in
some instances there is value in examining legislative history to aid in
interpreting the meaning of an ambiguous statute. 112 As textualism
proponent Judge Easterbrook wrote in In re Sinclair, “[c]larity
depends on context, which legislative history may illuminate. The
process is objective; the search is not for the contents of the authors’
heads but for the rules of language they used.” 113 In the instant case,
there is ambiguity as to which rules of language Congress used in
drafting the Communications Decency Act. The court’s interpretation
states that a § 230(c)(1) is a stand-alone sentence that is properly
interpreted notwithstanding the surrounding text and title of the act.
Conversely, CLCCRUL’s position posited that the drafters intended to
qualify § 230(c)(1) with the surrounding text and title of the act.
Although, as demonstrated in the preceding paragraphs, the
112

See Green v. Bock Laundry, 490 U.S. 504, 527 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (proclaiming that where a statute produces an absurd result, it is
“entirely appropriate to consult all public materials” including the background of a
rule and its legislative history).
113
870 F.2d 1340, 1342 (7th Cir. 1989).
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CLCCRUL’s textual interpretation is logically superior to the court’s
interpretation, there exists a genuine question of linguistic
construction. Thus, as even Chief Justice Easterbrook’s prior holding
dictates, this ambiguity should be resolved by an examination of the
legislative history of the Act.
2. Legislative History of the Communications Decency Act
Legislative history 114 is commonly regarded as the focal point of
traditional Anglo-American theories of statutory interpretation. 115
Furthermore, despite attempts by textualists to virtually eliminate the
role of legislative history in statutory interpretation, a majority of
commentators remain champions of the modes of interpretation that
highlight legislative intent. 116 In the instant case, the legislative history
of the Communications Decency Act provides support for the position
that the Act was meant to apply to an interactive computer service
provider only when it takes an affirmative effort to screen illegal and
offensive material from its websites.
The Cox-Wyden amendment to Title V of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 became § 230(c) of the
Communications Decency Act. This amendment was inspired by what
congress felt was an unjust result in Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy
Services Co. 117 Thus, it is pertinent to consider the Prodigy decision.

114

For the purposes of this note, the term legislative history will utilize its
commonly accepted definition: “the internal legislative pre-history of a statute – the
internal institutional progress of a bill to enactment and the deliberation
accompanying that progress.” WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS
ON LEGISLATION STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 971-72 (4th ed.
2007).
115
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
221 (2d ed. 2006).
116
See Eskridge, supra note 115, at 990.
117
141 CONG. REC. H8469-H8470 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (statement of Rep.
Cox) (expressing discontent at increased liability for Prodigy because it took
affirmative steps to screen material in violation of its terms of use).
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In Prodigy, a securities investment banking firm, Stratton
Oakmont, Inc., brought claims against Prodigy Services Company
(“Prodigy”) for per se libel, among other things. 118 The main issue
before the Prodigy court was whether Prodigy was a publisher of
allegedly libelous statements posted by third party users on Prodigy’s
popular electronic message board, Money Talk” 119 The finding of
Prodigy as a publisher rather than a mere distributor of third party
information was central to Stratton Oakmont’s defamation claims
because one who repeats or otherwise republishes a libel is subject to
liability as if he had originally published it. 120 However, one who
merely relays a libel is liable only if they knew or had reason to know
of the libelous statements. 121 Thus, the court set out to determine if
Prodigy exercised enough editorial control over its computer bulletin
board to render it a publisher, and thus, subject it to the same editorial
responsibilities as a newspaper. 122
The court found that Prodigy was a publisher of its users’ content
because it: (1) held itself out to the public and its members as
controlling the content of its bulletin boards, and (2) implemented
control over the boards by utilizing technology and manpower to
delete offensive postings. 123 The court explained that Prodigy would
not have been held liable as a publisher but for these affirmative steps
to control the content of its bulletin board. 124 The court justified this
position by placing Prodigy’s decision to monitor its board within the
framework of free-market economic theory. 125 The court presumed
118

Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co., 1995 WL 323710, at *1
(N.Y.Sup. Ct. 1995).
119
The statements at issue in Prodigy included accusations that Stratton
Oakmont had committed criminal and fraudulent acts in connection with the initial
public offering of stock of Solomon-Page Ltd. Id.
120
Id. at *3.
121
Id.
122
Id.
123
Id. at *4.
124
Id. at *5.
125
Id. Free-market economic theory generally posits that it is preferable to
conduct economic activity through voluntary private exchange rather than
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that Prodigy screened the content of its bulletin boards in order to
profit over its competitors by becoming a more family-oriented
service, not for altruistic reasons. 126 Thus, the court stated that Prodigy
must also face the legal consequences of its screening. 127 In Prodigy,
this meant that Prodigy was liable as a publisher for the allegedly
libelous statements. 128
In response to Prodigy, Rep. Christopher Cox, co-sponsor of the
Cox-Wyden amendment that became § 230 of the Communications
Decency Act, stated that the amendment would take measures to make
sure that good samaritan screening would be rewarded rather than
being punished. 129 Impliedly unconvinced by Prodigy’s free-market
solution, Cox stated that the amendment would “protect computer
Good Samaritans, online service providers, [and] anyone. . .who takes
steps to screen indecency and offensive material for their customers. .
.from taking on liability. . .that they should not face. . .for helping us
solve this problem.” 130 Thus, Cox sought to make a deal with private
companies. He saw the bill as an exchange of immunity from liability
in situations such as Prodigy where interactive computer service
providers, such as Prodigy, are willing to take an active role in
screening “things not only prohibited by law, but prohibited by
parents.” 131 This incentive based approach stands in direct contrast to
Prodigy’s free-market approach and Craigslist’s interpretation of

government intervention. See, MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM
(1968). For a compelling and detailed critique free-market economic theory see
KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION: THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC
ORIGINS OF OUR TIME 35 (2d ed. 2001) (stating that “[i]t should need no elaboration
that a process of undirected change. . .should be slowed down, if possible, so as to
safeguard the welfare of the community”).
126
Id.
127
Id.
128
Id. at *4.
129
141 CONG. REC.. H8469-H8470 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (statement of Rep.
Cox).
130
Id.
131
Id.
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§ 230(c)(1) of the Communications Decency Act because neither of
them provide incentive to undertake the costly process of screening.
Other members of Congress also echoed their support for Cox’s
vision of the bill. Representative Pat Danner stated that she strongly
supported the efforts taken “to address the problem of children having
untraceable access through on-line computer services to inappropriate
and obscene pornographic materials available on the Internet.” 132
Similarly, Rep. Robert Goodlatte praised the amendment because it
“removes the liability of providers such as Prodigy who currently
make a good faith effort to edit the smut from their systems. It also
encourages the online services industry to develop new technology,
such as blocking software, to empower parents to monitor and control
the information their kids can access.” 133
Additionally, Cox stated that the bill will “establish as the policy
of the United States that we do not. . .wish to have a Federal Computer
Commission with an army of bureaucrats regulating the Internet.” Id.
Although this statement resembles laissez-faire, free-market rhetoric,
it should not be read to imply that Cox would have accepted the
Craigslist court’s position that the plain meaning § 230(c)(1) of the
Communications Decency Act, granting publishers and speakers
immunity notwithstanding their efforts to screen inappropriate
material, is consistent with the intent of Congress. The court’s reading
of § 230(c)(1) creates a disincentive for publishers or speakers to
engage in screening of public material much like the way the Prodigy
court’s free-market prescription to the problem of liability for libelous
statements did. Under the Prodigy free-market approach, an interactive
computer service provider that screens is considered a publisher for
purposes of liability. Similarly, under the Craigslist court’s
interpretation of § 230(c)(1) of the Communications Decency Act, an
interactive computer service provider always has civil liability for
publishing third party content. Thus, there is no incentive to engage in
costly screening efforts. As noted above, Congress explicitly rejected

132
133

Id.
Id.
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this type of prescription in favor of a more incentive-based solution
which offers immunity in return for screening.
In sum, the legislative history of the Communications Decency
Act supports the CLCCRUL’s reading of § 230(c)(1). Although there
is an ambiguity in the text of that section, the legislative history shows
that CLCCRUL was correct to suppose that Congress intended
§ 230(c)(1) was to be read in light of the surrounding provisions. Thus,
an interactive computer service provider should only be offered
immunity under that section of the Communications Decency Act only
where it takes affirmative efforts to screen illegal and offensive
material from its services.
3. Analysis
The section above detailed substantial support from the text and
legislative history of the Communications Decency Act for the
position that the Act’s § 230(c)(1) immunity applies only to interactive
computer service providers that screen for offense material. This
section applies familiar principals of statutory interpretation to this
evidence to demonstrate why the Act’s immunity should be so limited.
First, it is pertinent to recognize that the Communications
Decency Act is wholly devoid of any mention of the Fair Housing Act,
civil rights, or any other federal laws. 134 In Craigslist, Chief Judge
Easterbrook admitted that “Congress did not even remotely
contemplate discriminatory housing advertisements when it passed
§ 230.” 135 Moreover, the court noted that “nothing in § 230's text or
history suggests that Congress meant to immunize an interactive
computer service providers from liability under the Fair Housing
Act.” 136
At this point in the court’s analysis, it would have been proper for
Chief Judge Easterbrook to acknowledge the familiar rule against
134

Chicago Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc., v. Craigslist,
Inc., 519 F.3d 666, 672 (7th Cir. 2008).
135
Id.
136
Id.
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repeals by implication which states that “Congress does not create
discontinuities in legal rights and obligations without some clear
statement.” 137 In Craigslist, the court’s interpretation of the
Communications Decency Act has left § 3604(c) of the Fair Housing
Act fragmented despite absence of any evidence of framer’s intent to
do so. 138 Once a universally broad statute, 139 applying to “any
publishing medium,” 140 it is now powerless against interactive
computer service providers that are distinguishable only because their
information can be found on internet rather than in paper-based or
verbal forms. Therefore, applying the rule against repeals by
implication, the court should have held that the CDA does not
fragment the coverage of the Fair Housing Act by giving a free pass to
interactive computer service providers who do not engage in screening
for offensive material. To not follow this principle of statutory
interpretation would beg the absurd result that a newspaper company
would be required to screen classified housing advertisements for its
print edition but could publish discriminatory advertisements free from
liability in its online edition.
Notwithstanding this illogical result, the court held that Congress’
silence regarding the Fair Housing Act was inconsequential.141 The
court declared that in order to exclude the Fair Housing Act from the
reach of § 230(c)(1) of the Communications Decency Act, Congress
must have explicitly stated that it was excluded. 142 In support, the
court cited the rule that “Congress need not think about a subject for a
law to affect it; effects of general rules continue unless limited by

137

Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 554 (1989). See also Green v. Bock
Laundry, 490 U.S. 504, 521-22 (1989).
138
Craigslist, 519 F.3d at 671.
139
The Fair Housing Act explicitly states that its purpose is “to provide, within
constitutional limitations, for fair housing throughout the United States.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 3601 (2000).
140
U.S. v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205, 210-11 (4th Cir. 1972).
141
Craigslist, 519 F.3d at 671.
142
Id. at 671.
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superseding enactments.” 143 The court reasoned that the
Communications Decency Act is a general statue because of Congress’
use of the word “information” in §230(c)(1). 144 The court recognized
that the impetus of the statute was to protect interactive computer
service providers, like Prodigy, from being punished for good
samaritan screening of inappropriate content. 145 However, it argued
that by utilizing the word “information” instead of expressly
indentifying what types of information the Communications Decency
Act covers, the Act was intended to have a general application. 146
Thus, the court interpreted Communications Decency Act to apply to
the Fair Housing Act despite Congress’ silence on the subject.147
The Craigslist court failed to consider that congress expressly
stated the Communications Decency Act’s intended effect on other
laws in § 230(e) of the Communications Decency Act. 148 In Section
§ 230(e)(3), the court identified the statute’s intended effect on state
law by stating, “[n]o cause of action may be brought and no liability
may be imposed under any State or local law that is inconsistent with
this section” However, nowhere does the statute make note of its
intended effect on inconsistent federal law. Where the legislature is
silent regarding the effect legislation will have on a legal rule, there is
a presumption that a prior legal rule should be retained. 149 Congress
was silent regarding the Fair Housing Act. Thus, it is proper to
143

Id. (citing a descriptive parenthetical from Regional Rail Reorganization
Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 126-127 (1974).
144
Id. at 671.
145
Id.
146
Id.
147
Id.
148
Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 230(e) (2000).
149
Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep’t of Educ., 127 S.Ct. 1534, 1541 (2007)
(holding that there is a presumption that a prior legal rule should be retained if no
one in legislative deliberation even mentioned the rule); Shine v. Shine, 802 F.2d
583, 587 (1d Cir. 1986) (stating that where the legislature is silent regarding a
particular effect of a bill, the bill should not be read to effect a reversal of the longstanding principles governing an area of law because “[s]uch a reversal would surely
have been noted in the congressional discussions.”).
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interpret the Communications Decency Act to not impact the allegedly
inconsistent, well-settled Fair Housing Act.
The Craigslist court offered an alternative basis for ignoring the
supportive legislative history and textual construction of the
Communications Decency Act. The court argued that although the
impetus of the statute was to protect interactive computer service
providers who screen offensive content, “[o]nce the legislative process
gets rolling, interest groups seek (and often obtain) other
provisions.” 150 Thus, the court implied that Congress changed its goals
for the Communications Decency Act to offer immunity to all
interactive computer service providers notwithstanding any effort to
screen offensive material.
Although interest groups play a regrettably prevalent role in our
legislative process, the court was hasty to imply that this is the only
possible explanation for the wording of § 230(c)(1). 151 In fact, it is
also common to our legislative process that the legislature makes
mistakes and simply drafts poorly worded bills. 152 Furthermore, albeit
less likely, sheer laziness on behalf of the drafters of the Cox-Wyden
amendment could account for their choice to use the word information
instead of including every possible type of inappropriate or illegal
material. Finally, the drafters could have presumed that the use of the
broad term “information” would not be problematic as it was quite
obvious by the legislative history and the statutory construction of the
amendment that it was intended to be applied to offensive material.153
Each of these explanations for Congress’ word choice is superior to
the court’s explanation because the court’s explanation is mere
conjecture. There is nothing in the legislative history that suggests
150

Craigslist, 519 F.3d at 671.
Although the court may have had another explanation, it failed to articulate
it in Craigslist.
152
Green v. Bock Laundry, 490 U.S. 504, 527 (1989) (noting that if the words
of a statute were given their plain meaning, the statute would necessitate an
unconstitutional result).
153
47 U.S.C. § 230(c). See also 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2) (expressly identifying
types of “offensive material” such as that which is “obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy,
151

excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable”); See also supra Part III(a)(2).
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interest group lobbying for favorable provisions, nor is there any
mention whatsoever of affording any type of immunity to online
service providers who do not provide the public with good samaritan
screening. Absent such evidence, there is no reason to accept the
court’s argument that any lobbying took place that changed Congress’
intended application of the Act.
Finally, an ambiguous statute should not be interpreted to restrict
rights granted by a prior statute unless restricting those rights is
necessary to execute the new statute’s purpose. As stated above, the
purpose of the Communications Decency Act was to encourage
interactive computer service providers to screen objectionable material
by offering them civil immunity as a publisher or speaker when they
engage in such screening. The purpose of § 3604(c) of the Fair
Housing Act was to mitigate the harmful psychological effects of
racism and frustrate the efforts of those seeking to discriminate against
the protected classes of persons in the sale or rent of housing.
The court’s interpretation frustrates the purpose of the Fair
Housing Act by turning the internet into an arena for discriminatory
housing advertisements by providing the websites that host them civil
immunity. Furthermore, the court’s interpretation runs counter to the
purpose of the Communications Decency act because it provides a
disincentive for websites, like Craigslist, to screen illegal content, such
as discriminatory housing advertisement, from their websites. Thus,
under the court’s interpretation of the Communications Decency Act,
neither statute’s purpose is fulfilled.
In contrast, CLCCRUL’s proposed interpretation of the
Communications Decency Act fulfils the purposes of both statutes.
The CLCCRUL’s interpretation provides that unless an interactive
computer service provider uses some form of screening, it has no
immunity. 154 This interpretation fulfills the purpose of the
Communications Decency Act because it encourages interactive
computer service providers to screen inappropriate and illegal content
by rewarding them with immunity from civil liability. Furthermore,
the CLCCRUL’s interpretation allows the purpose of the Fair Housing
154

Craigslist, 519 F.3d at 669.

180
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2008

29

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 4, Iss. 1 [2008], Art. 7

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 4, Issue 1

Fall 2008

Act to be carried out by not frustrating its current state of universal
applicability. 155 In contrast, the court’s interpretation of the
Communications Decency Act tramples upon the rights guaranteed by
the Fair Housing Act by exempting interactive computer service
providers which make up a large and rapidly growing segment of the
market for housing advertisement. Therefore, because the court’s
interpretation is not necessary, and in fact contrary, to achieving the
purpose of the Communications Decency Act, the court’s
interpretation should have been rejected in favor of CLCCRUL’s
interpretation which suffers from neither of these deficiencies.
As this section demonstrates, the textual construction of the
Communications Decency Act, its legislative history, and even the
admission of Chief Judge Easterbrook reveal that Congress had no
intention of making it an end-run around liability under the Fair
Housing Act’s provision against publishing discriminatory
advertisements. And even if one should feel so strongly about the
single canon of statutory interpretation utilized by the court that one
thinks it should prevail over the several other more applicable canons
listed above, it should be remembered that “a thing may be within the
letter of the statute, and yet not within the statute, because it is not
within its spirit, nor the intention of its makers.” 156 Although there are
those that would disagree with this axiomatic principal, we would be
remiss to follow their lead and suffer such absurd and painful results
as those that will be discussed in Section IV below.
B. Alternative theories for liability under the Fair Housing Act
1. The Scope of the Fair Housing Act
The Craigslist court held that the Communications Decency Act
provided Craigslist civil immunity from being treated as the

155

However, because intent is not necessary for liability under the Fair
Housing Act, this too could be seen as a restriction on the Fair Housing Act’s reach.
156
Holy Trinity Church v. United States , 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892).
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“publisher” or “speaker” of user provided content. 157 The court then
swiftly, and without justification, declared that only “as [a] publisher
could Craigslist be liable” under the Fair Housing Act. 158 However, as
this section demonstrates, the court drew a hasty conclusion.
The Fair Housing Act’s ban on discriminatory advertisements,
notices, and statements is broad. 159 It covers not only those who
publish discriminatory advertisements, notices, and statements, but
also those who print them, make them, or cause them to be made,
printed, or published. 160 It is a well known canon of statutory
interpretation that each phrase in a statute must, if possible, be given
effect. 161 Furthermore, another well-settled canon of statutory
interpretation states that courts should avoid interpreting a provision in
a manner that renders other provisions superfluous. 162 Thus, although
the actions prohibited by the Fair Housing Act may seem almost
indiscernible at first glance, it is important that each word be
interpreted to give effect to its inherently distinct meaning.
Perhaps the most highly litigated action prohibited under
§ 3604(c) of the Fair Housing Act is publishing. In 1968, when the
Fair Housing Act was passed, the word publish meant “[t]o make
public; to circulate; to make known to the people in general.” 163 In the
instant case, the discriminatory advertisements were made public by
Craigslist posting them on their website. However, under the court’s
interpretation of the Communications Decency Act, an interactive
computer service provider is precluded from civil liability for
publishing third-party content. Thus, if one accepts the court’s
interpretation, Craigslist is immune for its activities as a publisher.
Section 3604(c) also makes it illegal to print discriminatory
advertisements. As the district court pointed out in Craigslist, when
157

Craigslist, 519 F.3d at 671.
Id.
159
United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205, 210-11 (4th Cir. 1972).
160
Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (2000).
161
United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538-539 (1955).
162
Walters v. Metro. Educ. Enters., Inc., 529 U.S. 202, 208-209 (1997).
163
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1297 (Revised 4th ed. 1968).
158

182
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2008

31

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 4, Iss. 1 [2008], Art. 7

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 4, Issue 1

Fall 2008

the drafter’s of the Fair Housing Act passed the bill in 1968, to print
meant simply to “[t]o stamp by direct pressure as from the face of
types, plates, or blocks covered with ink or pigments, or to impress
with transferred characters or delineations by the exercise of force as
with a press or other mechanical agency.” 164 The Communications
Decency Act is silent regarding interactive computer service provider
immunity for “printing.” Nonetheless, Craigslist’s actions do not fit
the Fair Housing Act’s prohibition because creating a computer file
and placing it on a server is highly dissimilar to applying ink to paper.
Thus, Craigslist could not be held liable under this part of § 3604(c).
Furthermore, the Fair Housing Act makes it illegal to cause a
discriminatory advertisement to be made, printed, or published. In
1968, the word cause meant to be the occasion of or “to effect as an
agent” 165 The Craigslist court rejected the claim that Craigslist could
be liable for causing the advertisements to be made, printed, or
published. 166 The court stated that, “causation in a statute such as
§ 3604(c) must refer to causing a particular statement to be made or
perhaps the discriminatory content of a statement.” 167 Other courts
have interpreted causation under § 3604(c) in a similar manner. In
Hunter, the Fourth Circuit stated that “in the context of classified real
estate advertising, landlords and brokers ‘cause’ advertisements to be
printed or published.” 168 Craigslist played no such role in the creation
of the discriminatory advertisements posted on its website. As the
Craigslist court correctly pointed out, “nothing in the service craigslist
offers induces anyone to. . .express a preference for discrimination.” 169
Thus, although the Communications Decency Act is silent regarding
liability for causing something to be made, printed, or published,

164

Id. at 1457.
Id. at 278.
166
Chicago Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc., v. Craigslist,
Inc., 519 F.3d 666, 671-72 (7th Cir. 2008).
167
Id. at 671
168
United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205, 210 (4th Cir. 1972).
169
Craigslist, 519 F.3d at 671.
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Craigslist was correctly found not liable under this part of § 3604(c) of
the Fair Housing Act.
Finally, § 3604(c) of the Fair Housing Act makes it illegal to make
any discriminatory notice, statement, or advertisement, with respect to
the sale or rental of housing. In 1968, the common definition of the
word make was “to cause to exist. . .[t]o form, fashion, or produce” 170
Under the court’s interpretation of the Communications Decency Act,
an interactive computer service provider is immune from being treated
as a speaker for the purposes of civil liability. The ordinary meaning of
the verb to speak is “to communicate. . .by talking” 171 Thus, an
interactive computer service provider cannot be held liable under
§ 3604(c) of the Fair Housing Act for making any orally
communicated statements. However, this immunity does not preclude
an interactive computer service provider, such as Craigslist, from
being found liable under § 3604(c) for making a discriminatory nonverbal advertisement or notice. The following section argues that
Craigslist made the discriminatory housing advertisements complained
about in Craigslist. Thus, the court should have held that Craigslist
was liable under § 3604(c) of the Fair Housing Act.
2. Liability for Making Discriminatory Advertisements
The Fair Housing Act provides that it is a violation of the act to
“make. . .any notice, statement, or advertisement. . .that indicates any
preference, limitation, or discrimination” in the sale or lease of
housing. 172 The common definition of the word make is “to cause to
exist. . .[t]o form, fashion, or produce.” 173 This section demonstrates
that the allegedly discriminatory advertisements at issue in Craigslist
were computer files that were made exclusively by Craigslist. Thus,
the court should have held Craigslist liable under the Fair Housing

170

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1107 (Revised 4th ed. 1968).
WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 566 (1990).
172
Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (2000).
173
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1107 (Revised 4th ed. 1968).
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Act’s prohibition against making discriminatory housing
advertisements.
The process of a Craigslist posting begins by a user accessing a
form on Craigslist’s website (“File 1”) designed to accept from the
user, among other things, a description of the housing the user seeks to
sell or rent, the asking price, and the location. Upon submitting the
information, the content that the user provided is sent to a web server.
When the information is at the web server, it is analyzed and
reformatted by a computer program. Subsequently, a new file (“File
2”) is created that contains the users input along with Craigslist’s
signature look, feel, and added features. File 2 is then placed on
Craigslist’s website to be viewed by the website’s future visitors.
Additionally, a hyperlink is created on another webpage that is used as
a reference to access and view that file. 174
The discriminatory advertisements at issue in Craigslist were not
the File 1 type. Although each visitor provided in File 1 the inspiration
for the contents of File 2, it cannot be said that any Craigslist user
made the resulting file. The following two scenarios illustrate this
point.
Consider the process of a person purchasing a housing
advertisement in the local newspaper. The person drives to the
newspapers office, fills out a form with information to assist the
newspaper in creating the advertisement, and hands the piece of paper
to an employee of the newspaper. The employee then takes the
customer’s input and creates an advertisement fit for publication. The
next day, the paper is distributed to its subscribers, complete with the
advertisement purchased by the customer.
Contrast this situation with a person who attempts to sell their
home by posting a notice on a public bulletin board. The person
simply writes the pertinent information on a piece of paper and places
the paper on the board. No other actors are required to create the
advertisement because the piece of paper is the end product.
174

For an overview of HTML programming and website design, see generally
Todd Stauffer, Absolute Beginner's Guide to Creating Web Pages (Que Publishing
2003).
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In the first scenario, it cannot be said that the advertisement was
made by anyone but the newspaper company. Although the person
provided input by filling out the form, that form is a completely
distinct object from the resulting advertisement. The customer had no
role in purchasing the materials, formatting the information,
instructing the printer, or any other activity associated with creating
the newspaper. Simply put, but for the newspaper’s efforts, the form
would simply be a form, not an advertisement in the newspaper. Thus,
if the advertisement contained a discriminatory message, it would be
proper to hold the newspaper company liable under the Fair Housing
Act’s prohibition against making discriminatory advertisements.
Conversely, the advertisement placed on the bulletin board was
created by the person who placed it there. The bulletin board had no
capacity to reformat or otherwise alter the piece of paper; the
advertisement was solely the product of the person’s own efforts.
Thus, if the piece of paper contained a discriminatory message, the
person who posted it would be liable under the Fair Housing Act’s
prohibition against making discriminatory advertisements.
Craigslist is analogous to the newspaper company. Like the
newspaper company, Craigslist offered a place for user input,
processed the input, and, unlike the bulletin board, created a new
product. Furthermore, the new product in both of these situations
would not have been created, but for the efforts of the respective
services. Analogous to the newspaper office being closed, if the server
containing Craigslist’s formatting program was down, the resulting
advertisement could not have been made.
The Fair Housing Act makes it illegal to “make. . .any notice,
statement, or advertisement” that contains a discriminatory message.
Each of these words should be presumed to not be redundant. In
Craigslist, it is clear that by inputting a discriminatory message into
the website form, the user made a discriminatory statement. However,
as demonstrated above, this form was not the advertisement. The
advertisement, albeit containing the statement provided by the user,
was made by the computer program on Craigslist’s servers that was
programmed to create a Craigslist advertisement with Craigslist’s
signature look, feel, and added features.
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Furthermore, it is pertinent to note the distinction between
Craigslist’s role as a publisher and as a maker of the allegedly
discriminatory advertisements at issue in Craigslist. As noted above,
Craigslist made 175 the advertisements when Craigslist’s computer
program took the users input and created File 2. However, Craigslist
did not publish 176 File 2 until it placed it on its web space to be viewed
by the public. This distinction is crucial because although the court’s
interpretation of the Communications Decency Act provides civil
immunity for interactive computer service providers from being
treated as a publisher or speaker, the Act provides no such immunity
for those who make a discriminatory advertisement. 177 Therefore, the
Craigslist court erred by not holding Craigslist liable under the Fair
Housing Act’s Ban on making discriminatory advertisements.
IV. THE CRAIGSLIST COURT WAS INCORRECT TO IMPLY THAT PUBLIC
POLICY DICTATES THAT INTERACTIVE COMPUTER SERVICE PROVIDERS
SHOULD BE AFFORDED IMMUNITY.
In Craigslist, Chief Judge Easterbrook spent a substantial portion
of the opinion providing dictum on the public policy reasons for

175

When the Fair Housing Act was passed, the word make meant “[T]o cause
to exist. . .[t]o form, fashion, or produce.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1107
(Revised 4th ed. 1968).
176
When the Fair Housing Act was passed, the word publish meant “[t]o make
public; to circulate; to make known to the people in general.” BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 1297 (Revised 4th ed. 1968)..
177
In Tyus v. Robin Constr. Corp., the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois rejected an agency's argument that it could not be held
liable under § 3604(c) because it did not publish the advertisements in question.
1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2791, *9-*10 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 4, 1993). The court held that
although the advertising agency was not the publisher of the advertisements, it was
still liable because creating the advertisements fell “within the ambit of the statute.”
Id. at *9. The court explained that § 3604(c) “does not limit liability only to those
who publish an advertisement. That provision also expressly imposes liability on
those who ‘make. . .any advertisement. . .that indicates any preference. . .based on
race, [or] color.’" Id.
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absolving Craigslist of liability as a publisher or speaker. 178 This
section argues that interactive computer service providers require no
such special treatment.
The Craigslist court began its policy analysis by implying that
§ 3604(c) of the Fair Housing Act may violate the Free Speech
Clause 179 of the First Amendment regardless of the publishing
medium. 180 The court noted that single-family homes sold or rented by
an owner who does not own more than three single-family homes are
exempted from the Fair Housing Acts ban on discriminating in the sale
or purchase of a home. 181 However, § 3604(c)’s ban on discriminatory
advertising still applies in these situations. The court found this
problematic; it stated that “any rule that forbids truthful advertising of
a transaction that would be substantively lawful encounters serious
problems under the first amendment.” 182 However, despite the
Craigslist court’s warning, courts have consistently held that although
these types of landlords “are legally permitted to discriminate in the
sale or rental of housing [they still] may not advertise their intention to
do so.” 183 Moreover, it is well settled law that there is no disruption of
the traditional role of the free press by the prohibition of the
publication of discriminatory advertisements. 184 Thus, the Fair
Housing Act’s prohibition against discriminatory advertisement is
likely not problematic under the First Amendment.
The Craigslist court further argued that the screening of usergenerated content would be prohibitively difficult for interactive
computer service providers. 185 The court posited that a simple filter
178

Chicago Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc., v. Craigslist,
Inc., 519 F.3d 666, 668-69 (7th Cir. 2008).
179
The First Amendment provides in pertinent part that “Congress shall make
no law. . .abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.” U.S. CONST. amend.. I.
180
Craigslist, 519 F.3d at 668.
181
Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b)(1) (2000).
182
Craigslist, 519 F.3d at 668.
183
United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205, 213 (4th Cir. 1972).
184
Id. at 212-13.
185
Craigslist, 519 F.3d at 668-669.
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that blocks words such as “white” would not work because the filter
would block neutral sentences such as: “‘red brick house with white
trim.’” 186 The court also posited that human filterers may be equally
poor at determining whether or not some advertisements are
discriminatory. 187 One of the advertisements complained about in
Craigslist read, “’Catholic Church and beautiful Buddhist Temple
within one block.” 188 The court held that one could interpret this in a
discriminatory as well as a harmless manner. 189
Although screening advertisements for discriminatory messages
requires significant effort, requiring interactive computer service
providers to do so is not unreasonable. In fact, the Fourth Circuit has
gone so far to say that a publisher can “easily distinguish between
permissible and impermissible advertisements in discharging its duty
to reject those that violate § 3604(c).” 190 Furthermore, courts have
required virtually every other conceivable medium of expression to
engage in screening for § 3604(c) violations. 191 Interactive computer
service providers should not be allowed a free pass simply because
they generally receive higher volumes of advertisement submissions.
The drafter’s of the Fair Housing Act made it clear that they intended
to “alter the whole character of the housing market.” 192 Thus,
Congress certainly did not intend to bend the requirements of the Fair
Housing Act whenever a company received too many requests for
advertisements.
Finally, the court argued that the high volume of submissions
would require Craigslist to hire more staff and pass the added expense
on to the consumer. 193 The court is certainly correct that screening is
expensive. However, this is a cost that newspapers and every other
186
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publishing medium have bared since the Fair Housing Act was passed.
For a newspaper to increase its volume, it must increase its staff. By
exempting interactive computer service providers for § 3604(c)’s ban
on discriminatory advertising, interactive computer service providers
have been given a distinct and unjustified competitive advantage over
their competitors that use other publishing mediums.
Although there is often reason to regulate market-based
competition to protect a needy segment of the population, interactive
computer service providers offering internet-based housing
advertisements are not such entities. In the past decade, websites such
as Craigslist have become a dominant force in the housing classified
market. In 2000, online classified advertisement revenue totaled just
over $500,000 million. 194 By 2006, that figure shot up to an
astonishing $3.1 billion. No small player in the market, Craigslist is
estimated to top $80 million in revenue in 2008 and would “easily” be
able to make over $200 million per year with minor changes to its
pricing structure. 195
Furthermore, any advantage awarded to interactive computer
service providers further handicaps the greatly imperiled newspaper
industry. 196 Typically, a newspaper derives eighty percent of its
revenue from advertising. 197 Since online classified advertisements
have entered the market, stock prices of newspapers have tumbled and
many papers have been forced to go out of business. 198
194

See, Diaz, supra note 26.
Elinor Mills, Report estimates Craigslist 2008 revenue at $80 million (April
3, 2008) , http://news.cnet.com/8301-10784_3-9911097-7.html.
196
HELEN THOMAS, WATCHDOGS OF DEMOCRACY? THE WANING
WASHINGTON PRESS CORPS AND HOW IT HAS FAILED THE PUBLIC 113 (Scribner
2006) (noting that even industry moguls such as Warren Buffett, whose company
owns an 18 percent interest in the Washington Post Company, predicted that the
economic health of newspapers is deteriorating).
197
Richard Pérez-Peña, Shrinking Ad Revenue Realigns U.S. Newspaper
Industry INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, Feb. 7, 2008, available at
http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/02/07/business/paper.php.
198
Sarah Rabil, Newspapers Axe Monday Issues on Paper Cost, Ad Slump
BLOOMBERG Oct. 13, 2008,
195

190
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2008

39

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 4, Iss. 1 [2008], Art. 7

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 4, Issue 1

Fall 2008

Whether print media should be saved or should be left to die by
the invisible hand of the market is beyond the scope of this Note. It is
sufficient to point out, as detailed above in this section, that the court
proffered no substantial justification for providing interactive service
providers with special privileges not enjoyed by any other mediums of
expression. Thus, absent a compelling justification not identified in
Craigslist, public policy dictates that interactive computer service
providers should be held to the same standard under the Fair Housing
Act’s ban on discriminatory advertisements as every other medium.
CONCLUSION
In 1968, the country was forever changed when Congress passed
the Fair Housing Act. At that moment in time, Congress demonstrated
to the entire nation that it was committed to a future wherein all
citizens would be able to experience discrimination free housing
opportunities. Acknowledging the harmful psychological effects of
public displays of discrimination, Congress included in the Fair
Housing Act a strong and thorough ban on the dissemination of any
type of discriminatory message in the sale of lease of real property.
This ban remained complete until it was fragmented by courts
interpreting the Communications Decency Act to provide interactive
computer service providers with civil immunity from being treated as
a publisher or speaker of third-party content.
In Craigslist, the Seventh Circuit was presented with an
opportunity to correct the prevailing misinterpretation of the
Communications Decency Act, but balked at the invitation. As this
Note demonstrates, the textual construction and the legislative history
of the Communications Decency Act both favor an interpretation of
§ 230(c)(1) that an interactive computer service provider should be
afforded immunity as a publisher or speaker of third-party content
only when it fulfills its duty to screen its service for inappropriate and
illegal content. Furthermore, notwithstanding the immunity offered by
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601109&sid=av5s4KX3injQ&refer=
home

191
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol4/iss1/7

40

Opron: License to Kill (the Dream of Fair Housing): How the Seventh Circ

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 4, Issue 1

Fall 2008

the Communications Decency Act, Craigslist should have been found
liable under the Fair Housing Act’s ban on making discriminatory
advertisements.
Although Congress never contemplated the effect of the
Communications Decency Act on the Fair Housing Act, the continuing
debate over the proper interpretation of the Communications Decency
Act has put the onus on Congress to take a side. Consistent with the
arguments of this Note, Congress should amend the Communications
Decency Act to explicitly state that an interactive computer service
provider cannot be held civilly liable under § 3604(c) of the Fair
Housing Act for printing, publishing, or making a discriminatory
notice, advertisement or statement only when it engages in the good
faith screening of third-party content posted on its services.
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